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Abstract: Games are particularly relevant for field research in agriculture, where alternative
experimental designs can be costly and unfeasible. Games are also popular for non-experimental
purposes such as recreating learning experiences and facilitating dialogue with local communities.
After a systematic review of the literature, we found that the volume of published studies employing
coordination and cooperation games increased during the 2000–2020 period. In recent years,
more attention has been given to the areas of natural resource management, conservation, and ecology,
particularly in regions important to agricultural sustainability. Other games, such as trust and
risk games, have come to be regarded as standards of artefactual and framed field experiments in
agriculture. Regardless of their scope, most games’ results are subject to criticism for their internal and
external validity. In particular, a significant portion of the games reviewed here reveal recruitment
biases towards women and provide few opportunities for continued impact assessment. However,
games’ validity should be judged on a case-by-case basis. Specific cultural aspects of games might
reflect the real context, and generalizing games’ conclusions to different settings is often constrained
by cost and utility. Overall, games in agriculture could benefit from more significant, frequent,
and inclusive experiments and data—all possibilities offered by digital technology. Present-day
physical distance restrictions may accelerate this shift. New technologies and engaging mediums to
approach farmers might present a turning point for integrating experimental and non-experimental
games for agriculture in the 21st century.
Keywords: review; games; field experiments; participatory processes; agriculture
1. Introduction
A game is a system in which players engage in an artificial conflict or problem, defined by rules,
resulting in a quantifiable outcome [1]. Games in agriculture fieldwork are designed to test hypotheses,
simulate a situation to educate and recreate an experience, or both. Games with experimental
and non-experimental purposes are critical in agriculture to understand how individuals process
information and make decisions. On the experimental side, field experiments in the form of games are
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increasingly popular. Such studies allow scientists to empirically measure the parameters of theoretical
models and lend behavioral insights to policy making discussions [2]. Experimental games are a useful
medium of research because they allow scientists to study how context can affect participant behavior,
and, unlike observational studies, to construct proper counterfactuals to understand behaviors and
social preferences [3,4]. Greater attention to context does not mean, however, that experimental games
do not have shortfalls. One of the major concerns with such methods is how results generalize to other
contexts and populations—that is, whether they have adequate external validity [3,5,6].
Games with non-experimental purposes, on the other hand, provide innovative ways to accelerate
learning and dialogue regarding topics such as economic and physical risk management (e.g., climate
variability, natural disasters, and price volatility). These, games help practitioners and researchers from
diverse disciplines and sectors involved in humanitarian and development work to communicate more
effectively on the field. Well-designed games generate emotional experience while inspiring farmers’
behaviors. For instance, games could help build discipline and collective cohesion in preparation for
critical decisions [1]. Frequently, these kinds of games do not aim to respond to general questions but
assess specific impacts or effects within a particular group. Although some hypothesis might underlie
the games, there is not an explicit experimental purpose. In most cases, some metrics for monitoring
and evaluation could be carefully designed to assess the impacts of the game within a community
where the game has been used systematically [1].
Overall, games can contribute to understanding individuals and groups by mimicking the
actual environments and incentive structures where policy interventions and actions will take place.
Games are a particularly relevant tool for overcoming obstacles in agricultural research and practice,
for example, the long-time frames needed to study agricultural decision making and crop output, or the
reaction to catastrophes, by simulating the setup and framing of issues surrounding climate change,
food security, biodiversity conservation, governance of natural resources and natural disasters. Despite
their ubiquitous use across many disciplines, the mobilization of experimental and non-experimental
games has remained surprisingly limited up to now compared to other fields such as consumption,
health, employment or the environment [1,7].
Recent literature highlights the relevance and potential of economic experiments as a tool for
agricultural policy evaluation [7], and examine a variety of experimental and quasi-experimental
approaches that analyze behavioral and risk preferences [8–10]. We are not aware, however, of a
systematic literature review of the use of experimental and non-experimental games to advance
fieldwork in agriculture, and the extent to which they are helping to inform, educate, understand
or predict behavior in specific regions, agricultural sectors and areas of interest. We fill this gap by
formulating clear questions and criteria to select, identify and analyze relevant studies and by proposing
how games can be used to pursue future research and to enhance communication and dialogue.
Questions
The overarching goal of this study is to analyze the existing literature on games and agriculture
between 2000 and 2020 to characterizes their focus and scope, and understanding their strengths,
weaknesses and improvement opportunities. To this end, we lead with three questions:
• Q1: What is the primary purpose and context of games in agriculture in this period?
• Q2: What is the scope of the game’s results and conclusions based on the
experimental/setting design?
• Q3: Is there evidence of any technological transition or evolution in the way that games have been
performed and implemented in rural areas?
In general, Q1 requires identifying the subjects and the context of each game, including the specific
agricultural sector involved and the behavioral test or purpose behind the game. Q2 is designed
to assess how robust, and replicable a game’s results and conclusions are. Finally, Q3 analyzes
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the experimental design and technological elements that affected games’ scalability, accessibility,
replicability, and costs.
2. Methods
In this study, we present a systematic literature review (SLR) based upon a pre-determined rubric
to evaluate each study. The SLR followed suggested PRISMA guidelines for preferred reporting
items [11]. We searched electronic databases in June 2020, including the Web of Science (WS) and
Scopus, the largest databases of peer-reviewed literature with multidisciplinary coverage of academic
articles [12,13]. To limit the scope of the review, we defined full and truncated search terms capturing
experiments, games, and agriculture in the following general search strings on the title, abstracts or
keywords: (game* OR experiment* OR test* OR behavior* OR gamif*) AND (agriculture OR farm* OR
smallholder).
This first screening layer included peer-reviewed articles published in English from 2000 to
the present (WS: 78,440 and Scopus: 118,016). We refined the search based on Scopus subject area
filter, including social science, economics, business and psychology (Scopus), and the closest WS
categories, which included economics, agricultural economics policy, business, behavioral science,
and interdisciplinary social science. As a result, WS suggested 3824 references while Scopus suggested
11,265. These numbers indicate that even if all WS references were duplicated, our first refined search
suggested more than ten thousand references (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Systematic literature review and screening process.
Given this large number of papers, we refined our search and were more specific on the first
component of the search string, including only (game* OR gamif*). Consequently, we defined the new
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string as (game* OR gamif*) AND (agriculture OR farm* OR smallholder). As before, we completed
the search based on the title, abstracts, or keywords. As a result, WS suggested 184 references while
Scopus 513. We then removed 135 duplicates, consolidating a final pool of 562 references (layer one).
We improved our first layer screening according to the following inclusion criteria:
(i) well-explained research or implementation methods, (ii) explicitly stated and described
game/experiment/test, (iii) impact or effect reported and iv) clearly described outcome related to farmer
behavior or decision making. For the second layer of screening, we excluded references following
these criteria: (i) economic models with game theory but without any fieldwork, tests or experiments
conducted with farmers; (ii) surveys or interviews without activities, games, tests or experiments
(even when fieldwork or visits occurred); (iii) publications with mixed methods, which included
critical perspectives, protocols, personal observation, and reviews but no experimental or game design,
nor interactions with farmers; (iv) studies that used the word “game” in a different context (i.e., wild
animals hunted); (v) studies on animal (non-human) behavior; and (vi) lab experiments and games
with subjects other than farmers to simulate “rural contexts” or farmers (mentioned in the following
section). As a result, layer two concluded with a pool of 104 references—46% were from Scopus,
50% were from Web of Science and 4% were found in both.
To review the papers in a systematic way, we defined specific categories that demanded different
levels of analysis. The basic level included direct metrics such as the agriculture sector or the number of
participants. The higher level included a more detailed assessment and judgment of the experimental
design. This comprehensive analysis required a careful reading of 51 papers that were randomly
selected in proportion to the papers found for each year in layer two. Proportions were preserved to
reflect the trend in topics and the ratio of publications across time. The number of articles analyzed is
comparable to previous reviews on agricultural economics experiments that range from 35 to 51 articles
analyzed. The latter include lab experiments, discrete choice experiments, and field experiments [8–10].
Of the 51 articles analyzed by the authors in this review, 45% were from Scopus, 51% from Web of
Science and 4% were found in both.
Categories
Game-based field experiments lie on the bridge between laboratory and the real world naturally
occurring data [3]. Lab experiments employ a standard pool of participants (students), an abstract
framing, and an imposed set of rules. Artefactual field experiments (AFE) are the same as a conventional
lab experiment, but participants are not students but individuals participating in the field environment
of interest [9]. Framed field experiments (FFE) move a step closer to a naturally occurring setting,
including the field and context of participants in either the commodity, task, or information set that users
can use [4]. Finally, natural field experiments are similar to FFE, but participants are performing their
everyday decisions in their natural environment without knowledge that they are being observed [3,4].
Since our main goal is to capture real-life contexts and decision making, our review considers mainly
field experiments and games that can be mainly classified as AFE and FFE. In addition, as we anticipated
that a significant portion of the games occur in low- and middle-income regions, with significant income
and education differences between students and farmers, we exclude games where students assumed
the role of farmers [14]. These kinds of experiments involving farmers (as opposed to students) are
also more likely to be considered by policy makers [8].
In their attempt to better communicate and reach the target populations, non-experimental games
adopt different formats. They usually have an explicit and carefully thought-out educational purpose
(serious games). They can also expand from the domain of the game to the domain of ordinary life
(pervasive games), and engage farmers in experiencing complex systems to better understand their role
transforming that system (inhabitable games) [1]. All these categories were considered in the review
as long as they were filling the inclusion criteria and were not limited to prototypes, case studies or
interviews without farmers active enrollment.
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To characterize the games being studied, we defined four thematic domains. Social preferences
included games measuring altruism, reciprocity trust, fairness, and subjects’ behavior and attitudes
toward others’ wellbeing. Coordination and cooperation games included canonical and non-canonical
experiments of public good games, common pool resources dilemmas, and governance challenges.
Market games and simulations included games that mimic the rules of various real-world market
institutions (e.g., auctions and insurance) and that measure willingness to buy or sell different
products and services. These three domains encompassed strategic interactions and thinking among
individuals and groups. The final domain, behavioral and cognitive bias included games focused
on individual decision making, behavior, and capacities, specifically risk preferences and attitudes,
memory, intertemporal behavior and discounting, and adoption and learning of new technologies.
Agricultural sectors, when defined, were classified by growing crops, raising animals, fishing, hunting,
and forestry. Moreover, we identified the context in which games took place to determine the areas
where recommendations and conclusions apply, specifically farm risk (climate risk, financial and
market risk, and pest and diseases), conservation and natural resource management (land, water,
biodiversity), inclusion and poverty (gender, ethnicities, food security, health), and networks and
social capital formation (including formal and informal institutions, organizations, and regulations
(Table A1).
We defined specific categories to assess the scope, validity, and robustness of the games. Some of
these categories involved direct metrics, while others required some level of judgment. Direct metrics
included (i) the number of participants; (ii) the number of rounds and/or repetition of the game; (iii) the
report of a balanced sample in terms of gender, age and ethnicity of participants; (iv) the monetary and
non-monetary incentives (real and simulated); and (v) the presence of power calculations, which can
shed light on whether a study has a sufficient number of participants to detect an effect, and the validity
of any detected effect sizes [15].
We judged the robustness of each study’s findings based on whether the experimental design
considered credible counterfactuals and/or accounted for the potential existence of confounding factors.
We also evaluate the technologies used to collect data and whether there was a possibility for continued
data collection and impact assessment. We considered metrics that reflect how personalized the data
collection process was including (i) the identification of the facilitator (i.e., researcher, local collaborator,
or digital tool), (ii) the modality or interface (i.e., paper based, cell or smartphone web-based software)
of the game and (iii) the player’s possibility of sharing the game with other members of their community.
We reviewed each paper based on the above standardized categories, and we cross-checked codes for
internal consistency. We cleaned, analyzed, and graphed the data in R.
3. Descriptive Statistics and Results
Over the last twenty years, there has been a significant increase in the volume of publications
related to games in agriculture. Approximately two-thirds (67%) of these studies were intended as
experiments to measure some kind of generalizable principle, such as an aspect of economic behavior
or a policy effect. Half of these experimental games were classified as artefactual field experiments
while the other half corresponded to framed field experiments. The remaining 33% of studies involved
games where context-specific cases answered questions such as how a particular community interacted
with serious games.
Games were conducted mainly in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America in the context of
growing crops and, more recently, on forestry and livestock (Figure 2). In general, activities studied
became more diverse over time. For example, over the last 15 years, games were used for solving
issues within conservation, ecology and farm risk management issues (Figure A3). There was also
a clear increase in studies evaluating group and collective decisions beyond individual behaviors
(Figure A4). We found relatively fewer studies with games conducted in North America, Europe or
Australia, but there was a steady increase in the use of games in those regions after 2010. In terms of
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topic, coordination and cooperation games were the most frequent worldwide, and most prevalent in
Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Domain and frequency of studies by the agricultural sector, topic and region. Games were
more frequent in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, and mainly involved coordination and
cooperation. Social preference games were specially oriented to measure trust, while behavioral and
cognitive bias games focused on risk preferences and attitudes (Figures A1 and A2).
Regarding the scope and validity of the games, the majority of studies either did not report
or were not balanced on gender, age and ethnicity, and very few reported power calculations for
establishing sample size (Figure 3, red). Breaking the sample down by study focus, studies of individual
preferences and behaviors had a larger sample size, and they were more gender-balanced than studies
of cooperation and coordination, and games related to market simulations. However, individual
behavior studies were also much less likely to have repeated follow-up studies over time or use real
monetary incentives (Figure 3, red). Studies of cooperation and coordination were judged with the
lower level of causal validity, and studies of market games and simulations were more likely to have
confounding factors (Figure 3, blue).
Of the 46 studies that recorded survey modality, only 7 (15%) were digital (web-based, computer
or tablets), and the remaining 39 (85%) were paper-based. Similarly, out of 51 studies, 78% reported no
data gathering after the initial intervention or experiment, and 71% reported having no mechanism for
participant feedback over time. Approximately 30% of the games incentivized participants with actual
monetary rewards, while only 17% were associated with intrinsic motivations. The remaining 52%
used simulated/hypothetical monetary rewards.
Regarding the results of the papers reviewed, Table 1 summarizes key findings by topic and scope
(as defined above). For instance, a body of evidence suggests that contribution to public goods is greater
in smaller and more familiar settings, and that the efficacy of policies to promote environmental public
goods depend on their design. Another consistent finding in the literature is that small, self-policing
organizations exhibit more cooperative behavior, and that individual incentives influence cooperative
behavior. In the area of market games and simulations games, multiple papers find that that markets
for environmental goods are sensitive to design choices, and playing games that educate people about
financial instruments can eventually affect demand. Behavioral and cognitive bias games show that
extrinsic motivators do not appear to crowd out intrinsic motivations. Moreover, risk games suggest
that preferences revealed through games often reflect real-world risk factors. Finally, social preference
games reported in this review suggest that familiarity with neighbors leads to more pro-social behavior;
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social trust influences technology adoption; trust influences farmers’ willingness to participate in
potentially risky social actions; and scarcity is not always an explanation for anti-social behavior.
Figure 3. Average research scope by topic. Blue represents measures that required reviewers’ judgment.
Variables representing aspects of research quality were transformed into a 0–1 scale for comparability
(see Appendix A, Table A2 for the coding scheme).
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Table 1. Major results summary by topic and scope.
Scope * References
Above Median Score (1.3) Below or in the Median Score (1.3)
n = 51
n = 25 n = 26
Coordination and Cooperation Games (n = 19)
n = 10 n = 9
Public good games (n = 3): Contribution to public goods is greater in
smaller, more familiar settings: A natural experiment in Sri Lanka [16]
finds that members of larger farming communities were less willing to
contribute to a public goods game.
The efficacy of policies to promote environmental public goods
depends on their design: A simulation game with farmers in
Europe [17] finds that action-based incentives (i.e., rewards for
individual planting behavior) were more effective at promoting
biodiversity conservation than results-based incentives (i.e., rewards for
collective biodiversity outcomes).
However, game actions may not always predict actual public goods
behavior: An observational study in Sierra Leone [18] finds that
behavior in a public goods game had no meaningful correlation with
actual pro-social behavior in a community development program.
Coordination and cooperation games (n = 7):
Small, self-policing organizations exhibit more cooperative behavior:
In the Philippines, a study finds evidence that farmers’ common-pool
game contributions depended on their neighbors’ actions [19]. Similarly,
a study in the Republic of Congo [20] finds that self-monitoring reduced
free riding in a common pool game.
Individual incentives influence cooperative behavior: A study in the
US finds that farmers’ propensity to cooperate in a game depended on
their degree of risk aversion and their expectation of others’
behavior [21]. A study in Germany finds that a social nudge reduced
farmers’ free riding in a simulation game [22]. Likewise, a study in Latin
America finds that individual incentives were more effective than
collective incentives in promoting cooperation in an ecosystem services
simulation [23].
In the Philippines, a study finds that women and men had almost equal
decision-making power in an intra-household farm investment
simulation [24].
Behavior in games can be a good proxy of farming organizations’
financial health: An observational study in Ghana [25] finds that the
financial performance of farmer cooperatives in Ghana was correlated
with its members’ behavior in a risky dictator game.
Public good games (n = 1): An observational study of coffee farmers in
Costa Rica [26] finds that farmers from different communities
contributed less to a public goods game than farmers from the same
community and that free-riding behavior was correlated with actual
free-riding behavior.
Coordination and cooperation games (n = 7):
Five of these studies were descriptions of serious games without
quantitative hypothesis tests (only qualitative accounts of
participants’ actions and feedback).
A study in South Africa and Namibia finds that contributions to a
common-pool resource game were greater in homogenous
sociodemographic settings [27]. An observational study across
communities in the Levant finds that farmers from places with
communal water management systems were less likely to free-ride in
a simulation game, as compared to farmers from places with
top-down water management systems [28].
Above median:
Sawada et. al. (2013) [16]; Voors et. al. (2012) [18];
Doerschner and Musshoff (2015) [17]; Francesconi et al. (2015) [25];
Hayo and Vollan (2012) [27]; Marrocoli et al. (2018) [20];
Midler et. al. (2015) [23];
Peth and Musshoff (2020) [22];
Singerman and Useche (2019) [21];
Tsusaka et al. (2015) [19];
Maligalig et. al. (2019) [24]
Below median:
Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa (2017) [26];
Msaddak et al. (2019) [29];
Barreteau et al. (2001) [30];
Ibele et al. (2017) [28];
Garcia-Barrios (2011) [31];
Moreau et. al. (2019) [32];
Hardy et al. (2020) [33];
Sausse et. al. (2013) [34].
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Table 1. Cont.
Scope * References
Market Games and Simulations (n = 10)
Above Median Score (1.3) Below or in the Median Score (1.3)
n = 2 n = 8
Markets for environmental goods are sensitive to design choices:
A RCT in Liberia, using a simulation game, finds that monetary
incentives to reduce fertilizer usage were more effective when they were
framed as punishments rather than rewards, but less sustainable [35]. In
contrast, a RCT in Tanzania [36] finds that PES was more effective in
improving forest conservation than mandated levels of contribution
(backed by penalties).
Insurance demand (n = 3): A study in India finds that the average
willingness to pay for weather insurance was approximately 9% of
the maximum possible payout, and that demand was greater for
the group as compared to individual insurance [37]. A simulation
in Ethiopia finds that farmers exhibited a preference for insurance
over other risk management options, including high-interest
savings [38]. A RCT in Ethiopia finds that playing an educational
game increased uptake of index insurance by 10% [39]. In contrast,
a RCT in Ethiopia and Malawi finds that games and conventional
training practices were equally effective in inducing demand for
insurance [40].
Payment for environmental services (n = 2): A study in Indonesia [41]
finds that longer-established farmers and those with larger plots
were more likely to win PES auctions. Actual conservation
compliance cost was about 115% greater than the bid outcome on
average, and only about 55% of farmers completed their contracts.
A qualitative study in Latin America finds that the implementation
of PES schemes often rests on deep-seated power asymmetries and,
therefore, risks reproducing existing inequalities [42].
Other (n = 2): Two remaining studies were descriptions of
participatory design processes without any quantitative hypothesis
tests (only qualitative accounts of participants’ actions
and feedback).
Above median: Moser and Musshoff (2016) [35];
Kaczan Swallow and Adamowicz (2019) [36].
Below median:
Vasilaky et al. (2020) [39];
Norton et al. (2014) [38]; Leimona and Carrasco (2017) [41];
Berthet et al. (2016) [43];
Bos et al. (2020) [44];
Merlet et al. (2018) [42];
Seth et al. (2009) [37];
Patt et. al. (2010) [40].
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Table 1. Cont.
Scope * References
Behavior and Cognitive Bias (n = 15)
Above Median Score (1.3) Below or in the Median Score (1.3)
n = 7 n = 8
Extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivators: (n = 2) Extrinsic motivators do not
appear to crowd out intrinsic motivations: A study in Germany [45]
finds that both direct individual nudges and social comparisons reduced
farmers’ illicit fertilizer use in a simulation game, but that combining the
two did not lead to any additional effect. Likewise, a study in
Colombia [46] finds that PES did not change farmers’ self-reported
motivations for conservation, and that PES improved conservation
behavior in a simulation game, regardless of its design (i.e., individual
vs. collective payments).
Risk preferences/attitude: (n = 5) Risk preference revealed through
games often reflect real-world risk factors: A study in Paraguay [47]
finds that when the risk of theft is higher, the amount of gift-giving
increases and that risk attitudes are highly predictive of play in
behavioral games. Similarly, [48] finds that risk-averse farmers are less
likely to invest, even with insurance available. A study in Vietnam [49]
find that low-wealth farmers reduce their fertilizer intensity when their
risk aversion increases, and the marginal effect of risk aversion is
insignificant for high-wealth farmers.
Risk preference findings have implications for the “poverty trap”
model of development: A study in Ghana [50] finds that farmers are
more concerned with maximizing agricultural productivity than
minimizing variance.
Addressing Issues of power asymmetry (n = 1): One study [51] finds
that the use of games for collective decision making can encourage a
greater socioeconomic variety of farmers to voice their opinions.
Risk preferences/attitude: (n = 4) [52] looks at risk aversion in farmers
vs. freelancers and finds that farmers were more risk-averse than the
freelancers. However, both groups exhibited constant partial risk
aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. Ref. [53] finds that
most farmers preferred cash payments when given a choice to index
insurance contracts, even when the insurance contracts offered
substantially higher expected returns. Ref. [54] finds that it is more
important to consider a farmer’s situation, information available,
and the emotional state to predict risk aversion than assume a fixed
attitude among all farmers.
Different measurements of risk preferences may yield inconsistent
results: [55] finds that the elicitation technique chosen influences the
degree of farmers’ measured risk aversion.
Games and technology adoption (n = 3): Games can be a useful tool for
facilitating technology adoption: [56] finds that farmers who played
a serious game about shrimp farming increased information
exchange with peers, and consequently, increased the likelihood of
technology adoption.
However, games’ abstraction can limit their applicability: [57] finds
that participatory scenario development was better suited for
farmers’ collective decision-making processes than role-playing
games, which farmers found to be more abstract.
Group composition and individual identity influence productive
technology adoption: [58] finds that women have a stronger
preference for agroforestry, and male-only groups prefer more
production (timber) and protection forest. Ref. [59] looks at group
size and leadership and finds that smaller groups promote more
coordination, but leading by example, did not improve coordination.
Above median:
Brick et al. (2015) [48];
Khor et al. (2015) [49];
Katic et al. (2018) [50];
Schechter et al. (2006) [47]; Mueller et al. (2018) [47];
Moros et al. (2019) [46]; Peth et al. (2018) [45].
Below Median:
Barnaud, C. et al. (2010) [51];
Ye et al. (2013) [52]; Marenya et al. (2014) [53];
Lebel et al. (2018) [54];
Dionnet et al. (2008) [57]; Bosma et al. (2020) [56];
Nielsen et al. (2013) [55]; Villamor et al. (2017) [58].
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Table 1. Cont.
Scope * References
Social Preferences (n = 7)
Above Median Score (1.3) Below or in the Median Score (1.3)
n = 6 n = 1
Altruism (n = 1): Familiarity with neighbors leads to more pro-social
behavior: A quasi-experimental study in Cambodia (exploiting a
resettlement lottery) finds that resettled farmers gave 42–75% less to
their neighbors in a solidarity game [60].
Trust (n = 4): Social trust influences technology adoption: An RCT in
Ecuador finds that receiving agricultural advice from an extension agent
led to greater trust (as measured by a trust game) and greater learning
than when advice was given by a neighbor [61]. Likewise, two separate
observational studies in Ethiopia find that behavior in a trust game was
correlated with actual soil conservation behavior [62,63].
Trust influences farmers’ willingness to participate in potentially
risky social actions: A study in Ecuador finds that delayed loan
repayment led farmers to trust their partners less (as measured by a trust
game), and consequently made them less willing to loan money in the
future [64].
Other (n = 1): Scarcity is not always an explanation for anti-social
behavior: A study in Latin America finds that farmers’ cheating
behavior in a multi-round game did not depend on their current level of
scarcity in the game [65].
Other (n = 1): A study in Cameroon finds that “knowledge elicitation
tools” (semi-structured interviews with a game component) were an
effective method for measuring farmers’ attitudes toward
conservation [66].
Above median: Gobien and Bjoern (2016) [60];
Aksoy and Palma (2019) [65];
Bouma et. al. (2008) [62]; Buck and Alwang (2011) [61];
Romero and Wollini (2019) [64]
Ansink et al. (2017) [63].
Below median:
Bharwani et al. (2015) [66].
(*) Scope score = 1/2(sample size + 1/3(gender balance + ethnic balance + age balance)) + 1/2(repetition + incentives) + 1/2(validity + evident confounding factors). See Table A2.
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4. Discussion
The prevalence of games used for testing behavioral hypotheses (67%) compared to games with
educational but non-experimental purposes (33%) reflects researchers’ preference toward studies
that allow generalizing in some way the results found on the field. This concern is legitimate,
as experiments attempt better to inform policies and improve their design and implementation [7,9].
Indeed, the increasing number of framed field games and experiments in rural Asia, Africa, and Latin
America during the last twenty years have contributed to filling the information and modeling gaps
that characterize socioeconomic and environmental research in agriculture for those regions. However,
such causal studies often ran up against the practical difficulties of conducting fieldwork, especially
in rural contexts. Most games suffered in establishing whether their findings uncovered causal effects
for the population and the specific context being studied—that is, internal validity—as well as whether
game behavior reflected real-world decision making in other contexts—that is, external validity.
In addition, a significant portion of the experiments showed potential recruitment biases with little
participation by rural women who are usually excluded from social gatherings and activities [4,67].
Furthermore, spatial and temporal limitations on the scope of results were evident, as the games we
surveyed were predominately one-time interventions with no repetition, and no power tests were
performed to define the optimal sample size. Overall, the intention of games to produce generalizable
results to inform policies is threatened by systematic exclusion of population segments, difficulties in
tracking information and results over time, and a lack of large, representative samples. Those challenges
are especially complex when conducting fieldwork in rural areas.
Framed field experiments, if conducted well, can fill evidence gaps left by other popular methods
of empirical social science. For instance, while randomized control trials (RCTs) of policies are
often considered the gold standard for internal validity [68] (and “natural experiments” a next-best
alternative [2,3]), they are only part of the field experimenter’s toolkit, and cannot always speak to
external validity [3]. There are many situations in which natural experiments and RCTs have gaps in
their ability to inform policy. For instance, researchers cannot generate natural experiments but must
work with the exogenous events that have occurred, hopefully discovering an event that provides
identification. Likewise, RCTs can require scaling and experimental designs that are economically and
ethically infeasible in many situations [6,69]. Thus, field experiments and games have an essential
and unique role in advancing research in agriculture. The right approach should be to find innovative
ways to improve validity subject to fieldwork limitations and opportunities.
Ideally, a robust field experiment design should consider power calculations to define the optimal
sample size as well as other mechanisms that guarantee research transparency and traceability,
including pre-registration of analysis plans [70]. Additional protocols should also include “home”
and local institutional review boards, survey data to better characterize participants, and sufficient
cash and funds to compensate participants according to their preferred payment methods [9]. Most of
the time, however, those desirable standards clash with the realities in the field. Specifically, the lack
of effective mechanisms to track participants over time in rural settings reduces the possibility of
generating additional and more frequent information. In brief, universal protocols are challenging to
implement when the communication infrastructure does not exist, and the real possibilities to advance
and track the fieldwork process and results are limited. These common gaps reflect structural and
technological limitations to improve validity and scale research and games.
Some limitations to improve games’ validity are not necessarily structural and can be addressed
through innovative game design strategies. For instance, one-third of the games’ took advantage of
real money pay-offs to better simulate actual decision-making contexts. Financial incentives equivalent
to what participants’ economic gains could have been in a real-life setting ensure that individuals in
the experiment reveal their true preferences [7]. Most, but not all, participants received a payment
in the studies that we reviewed. Some payments were randomly assigned to reduce the costs of
the experiments. For instance, in the case of experiments that featured multiple rounds of games,
one binding round was randomly selected to ensure that participants would receive a real return
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without compromising the experiment budget [24]. In brief, judging an experimental design requires
understanding when the limitations compromise—or not—validity on a case-by-case basis.
Bias towards generalizable results also has a downside. For instance, gender imbalance or
specific cultural aspects might reflect, in practice, the real context where individual and collective
decisions are made, and behaviors shaped. The predictive value of the games’ findings in a different
context—the external validity-should be judged according to the diversity and complexity observed
in agricultural systems worldwide, and the policy and project goals associated with a specific game.
Not surprisingly, we found that some papers suggested that behavior in games did not reflect behavior
in the presence of actual programs [38,55]. In contrast, for other studies, there was evidence that
behavior in experimental settings correlated with real-world behavior [20,71–74]. The ambiguity in
external validity raises questions regarding the need (and the costs) of generalizing conclusions and
policy recommendations and highlights the importance of considering each study’s relative strengths
and weaknesses. Depending on the objective, it could be justifiable to sacrifice external validity and
generalization in defense of context-based responses sensitive to local social norms and culture [7].
In brief, there are clear opportunities to improve internal validity and identification strategies in most
of the games. However, validity needs to be judged according to the context of each game. The gold
standard should be the best method for the question at hand and not a universal approach [69].
Games in agriculture could benefit from more significant, frequent, and inclusive information.
However, games are neither effective nor efficient in many settings due to the costs of visiting remote
villages and the limited number of facilitators and participants. Scalability will likely improve in the
coming years with the increasing digital connectivity among agricultural practitioners [75]. Digital
tools can expand the frequency and sample size compared to games conducted on paper-based forms.
For example, researchers can use mobile applications (e.g., ODK) to input responses offline and make
data cleaning and analysis more efficient. [46]. More sophisticated tools have been developed, targeting
extensionists and technicians to reach farmers [76]. Europe, Australia, and the USA showed a moderate,
but increasing use of games, especially with the aid of innovative interfaces and technologies [7,17,22,45].
Furthermore, initial pilots and proposals also point to the possibility of using gamification—defined
as the use of game design elements in non-game contexts—in agriculture through websites, apps,
and SMS [77–80]. By definition, gamification is at the intersection of serious games, persuasive
technology, and personal informatics [81–83]. These components educate, incentivize, and track players’
behavior simultaneously. Overall, gamification provides an opportunity to integrate experimental and
non-experimental purposes in a single game while enhancing the learning experience and scaling the
data to test hypotheses and generalize results.
Technologies of this century can expand the scope and validity of games in agriculture. However,
the low level of digitalization among the papers that we surveyed shows that this integration is
still underdeveloped compared with other sectors [81]. The integration of new technologies and
games will require better connectivity conditions and researchers with the skills to make this happen.
The lack of investments and fixed costs of new technologies can undoubtedly constrain digital tools
and games in agriculture in less developed regions. Nonetheless, 70 percent of the poorest 20 percent
in low- and middle-income countries have access to a mobile phone, and one in three people have
internet access [84–86]. Although connectivity prevails in urban settings, it has also spread to rural
areas, where the ratio of farmers to extension workers exceeds 1000 to one [75,84–86]. Moreover,
with increased physical restrictions from COVID-19, there is a need to reach and engage with farmers
using innovative technologies. This opportunity might represent a transition for games in agriculture.
Similar to how massive data sets’ availability was critical to turning attention toward specific areas
of labor and industrial organization in the past [2], big data and games can switch attention toward
agriculture. Overall, conducting games and fieldwork in agriculture demands managing complex
sets of relationships between parties and presenting and communicating ideas and innovation to lay
individuals [3,87]. These characteristics define researchers’ value leading games and fieldwork in
agriculture to respond to today’s challenges.
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The growing popularity of coordination and cooperation games involving groups rather than
individuals is consistent with a greater focus on natural resource management, conservation,
and ecology—areas that depend on collective decisions. The games evaluated here primarily assessed
contributions to public goods and the determinants of cooperation for land use, water management,
biodiversity, ecosystem services, and organizational aspects. For instance, several studies from East
Asia documented how serious games could be used to resolve commons management issues in fishing
communities. Most Europe based studies reported how simulation exercises could be used to make a
business case for conservation agriculture in specific industries (e.g., [17,32,34]). These new questions
and focus areas did not replace, however, traditional games and settings during the last twenty years.
Market games and simulations—which have been common in South and Southeast Asia—reflect a
longstanding interest in understanding individual and collective behaviors in the context of farm risk
and inputs management [7,35,37,44]. Canonical experimental games to understand social preferences
and trust, including the ultimatum game and the dictator game, and lottery games to assess risk
behavior [88], were also performed in more diverse contexts, including ecosystem services and natural
resource management [46,63]. Moreover, the increased use of primary data and lottery games to elicit
risk preferences in diverse context—also reported in other reviews [10]—reflect the need to control
for the environment in which farmers operate, and that risk aversion is a relative concept likely to
be circumstance specific [10]. In brief, and although not perceived as “innovative”, the frequency of
canonical games suggest that they became a standard to support research in traditional and new areas
for sustainable agriculture.
The attention toward sustainable agriculture and the particular emphasis on the environmental
dimension coincides with recent policy-oriented reviews that highlight the increased interest in
understanding behavioral factors influencing farmers’ adoption of sustainable practices [7,8,89].
A meta-analysis is out of this paper’s scope. The influence of many external factors, such as cultural
background or location, increases the challenge of aggregating farmers’ preferences across a larger
geographical region [10]. From Table 1, we can see some consistent themes emerging. For instance,
questions related to payments and markets for ecosystem services, forestry, and gender differences
increased, especially after 2015 [36,41,58] and those empirical observations corroborated the role of
voluntary and mandatory policies for conservation based on farmer’s dispositional factors such as
environmental concerns and risk tolerance reported in other studies [8,10]. In addition, the papers
analyzed in our sample suggest—as do other studies—that farmers with intrinsic motivations to
protect the environment do not necessarily react negatively to extrinsic motivators and conservation
payments [8]. Overall, the rising interest in sustainability during the last twenty years [90] was reflected
in the higher frequency of cooperation games and other canonical games that took place in strategic
regions in terms of diversity, natural resources, and poverty.
5. Conclusions and Future Directions
The 21st century has witnessed a significant surge in studies that are gathering data via games,
and agriculture is not an exception. There is an increased emphasis on agricultural sustainability
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and a higher frequency of cooperation and coordination games
that reflect collective decisions for conservation and natural resource management. Other canonical
games related to social preferences, i.e., trust games, and individual decision making, i.e., risk games,
also remain prominent in the field. There is ample opportunity to scale existing games, improve
their validity by conducting games in multiple contexts and with various populations, and repeat
and monitor games and subjects over time. New technologies for data will play an essential role in
the purpose of improving identification strategies. Judging by the low but increasing percentage of
games using digital tools in agriculture, it is possible that gamification will play a role in the way that
games are designed and implemented for experimental and educational purposes. Emerging topics in
conservation and climate risk will likely shape the agenda in the coming years. Applied economists
and social scientists are called to be part of this challenging and exciting agenda by scaling existing
Games 2020, 11, 47 15 of 21
studies, incentivizing participation of excluded populations with engaging and innovative games,
and embracing the information communication technologies of this century.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Literature review categories.
Q1: What Is the Primary Purpose and Context of Games in Agriculture in This Period?
Subject Individual, group, both
Agriculture sector Growing crops, raising animals, fishery, forestry, hunting, farming
Region North Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, West Asia,North Asia, Latina America, USA/Canada, Europe, Australia
Thematic domain
Altruism, reciprocity, trust, fairness, other social preferences, public good games, other
coordination and cooperation, market games and simulations (e.g., willingness to pay),
risk preferences/attitudes, memory, intertemporal behavior/discounting, technology
adoption/acceptance, other behavior and cognitive bias
Production/management context
Financial and risk management, climate risk and natural disasters, natural resource
management: water, natural resource management: land, natural resource management:
other, conservation and biodiversity, ecosystem services and agroecological practices,
inputs management (e.g., tools and fertilizers), pest control and management, inclusion
and gender issues, health and nutrition/food security, human capital/education,
organizational aspects/cooperatives, social capital/community engagement, business
strategies and value chains, property rights, regulation/policies
Q2: What is the Scope of the Game’s Results and Conclusions Based on the Experimental Design?
Number of participants
1 to 10; 11 to 50; 51 to 100; 101 to 300; 301 to 600; 601 to 1000; 1001 to 3000; 3001 to 6000; 6001
to 10,000; 10,001 to 50,000; 50,001 to 100,000; more than 100,000 but less than one million;
one million or more.
Validity assessment
High: Randomized control trial experiments in the field with real-world outcomes.
Medium: Quasi-experimental controlled studyLow: Case study, single
subject-experimental, pre-test/post-test design. Evident confounding factors (yes/no).
Robustness indicators
Reported power calculation to estimate sample size (yes/no); experiment duration (hours,
days, weeks, months); experiment repetition (rounds on the game, whole game, no
repetition).
Balance indicators Gender balance (yes/no/no reported); different ages (yes/no/no reported); differentethnicities (yes/no/no reported).
Incentives Actual monetary incentives, simulated monetary incentives, other extrinsic incentives;intrinsic incentives; both (intrinsic and extrinsic).
Q3: Is There Evidence of Any Technological Transition or Evolution in the Way That Games and Experiments Have Been
Performed and Implemented in Rural Settings?
Setting: facilitator
Researchers’ leading workshops/games; extension service or local collaborators facilitating
workshops/games; digital tool or information technology (IT) for end-users (farmers);
digital tool or IT administered by local collaborators/extension services.
Setting: modality Paper-based, cell phone/SMS; smartphone/apps; web-based software/tablets/computer.
Continued assessment
The game can eventually be shared by initial participants with other potential players on
their communities (yes/no). There is opportunity to continuing data gathering after the
game/experiment is introduced and performed for the first time (yes/no). The
experiment/game facilitate feedback opportunities along the time (yes/no).
In addition to these specific categories, the reviewers’ analysis included identification of research question,
main hypothesis, major result and additional comments.
Games 2020, 11, 47 16 of 21
Table A2. Research scope normalization coding scheme.
Outcome Coding
Sample size 11 to 50 = 0.2; 50 to 100 = 0.4; 100 to 300 = 0.6; 300 to 600 = 0.8; more than600 = 1
Power calculation Yes = 1; no or not reported = 0
Gender balance Yes = 1; no or not reported = 0
Age balance Yes = 1; no or not reported = 0
Ethnicity balance Yes = 1; no or not reported = 0
Repetition Multiple rounds on the game = 1; multiple rounds of surveying = 1; noor not reported = 0
Incentives Actual monetary incentives = 1; simulated monetary incentives = 0,intrinsic incentives = NA
Validity assessment Low = 0; medium = 0.5; high = 1
Confounding factors Yes = 1; no = 0
Scope score = 1/2(sample size + 1/3(gender balance + ethnic balance + age balance)) + 1/2(repetition + incentives) +
1/2(validity + evident confounding factors).
Figure A1. Frequency of social preference studies by type.
Figure A2. Frequency of behavioral and cognitive bias studies by type.
Figure A3. Frequency of studies by activity focus over years.
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Figure A4. Frequency of studies by subject (individuals, groups, both) over years.
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